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Abstract 
 
In this thesis, we consider the standard voting model with a finite set of alternatives A 
and 2 voters, and address the following question: besides Domains D  satisfying the 
Property T ( Chatterji & Sen (2011) ), what are other characteristics of domains that 
induce every strategy-proof and unanimous social choice function : nf A    →D  to 
satisfy the tops-only property? We impose a minimal richness condition which 
ensures that for every alternative a A ∈ , there exists a preference ordering where a  
is maximal. We identify a more general condition on domains that is sufficient for 
strategy-proofness and unanimity to imply tops-onlyness in the case of 2 voters. This 
condition is shown to apply to Linked Domains ( Aswal, Chatterji & Sen (2003) ). 
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A social choice function (SCF) is a mapping from profiles of ordinal preference
orderings over a fixed set of alternatives to the same set of alternatives. Our
first requirement is that the SCF should be strategy-proof, which implies that for
every voter, true preference revelation is a dominant strategy. Next, we impose
the requirement of unanimity on SCFs, which says that when an alternative is the
most-preferred one for all voters in a profile of preferences, it must be the social
outcome. In this thesis, along with these two properties mentioned above, we
are going to discuss another important property of SCFs: the tops-only property.
The tops-only property requires that given any profile of preferences, the social
choice be determined by the peaks of all preferences in that profile. A tops-only
SCF is attractive from a design perspective. A Domain D is a subset of the set
containing all possible linear orders over the alternative set A. Tops-only domains
are those domains on which every strategy-proof and unanimous SCF satisfies the
tops-only property. The objective of this thesis is to investigate the connection
between tops-onlyness and strategy-proofness with unanimity.
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Given a SCF, a dictator is a voter whose most-preferred alternative is always
the social choice for every profile of preferences. Correspondingly, dictatorial
domains are those domains on which every strategy-proof and unanimous SCF
has a dictator. For instance, the Universal Domain (considered in the Gibbard-
Satterthwaite Theorem), Linked Domains (Aswal et al., 2003) and Circular Do-
mains (Sato (2010)) are all dictatorial domains. Since a dictatorial SCF always
picks the top-ranked alternative of a dictator, dictatorial domains are necessarily
tops-only domains. Even in the case of infinite alternatives, strategy-proof SCFs
on domains of continuous preferences with a unique most-preferred alternatives
on the range also satisfies the tops-only property (Weymark (2008)). Besides
dictatorial domains, some other prominent domains are also tops-only domains,
say the Domain of Separable Preferences and the Domain of Single-Peaked Pref-
erences.
In this thesis, we focus on the case where the set of alternatives is finite.
We assume the domain is the same for every voter. Our analysis is concerned
with domains satisfying the minimal richness property, which says that for each
alternative in A, there exists a preference ordering that sets that alternative as
the top-ranked one.
This thesis is essentially close to Chatterji and Sen (2011). They provide
a sufficient condition, named Property T, for a domain of preferences to be a
tops-only domain in the case of 2 voters. This condition is satisfied by many
restricted domains, like Adjacency Rich Single-Peaked Domains (Chatterji & Sen
(2011)). However, it is not applicable to Linked Domains which are dictatorial
and hence necessarily tops-only. In this thesis, we provide a more general version
of Property T, named Modified Property T, which ensures that a minimally rich
2
domain is a tops-only domain in the case of 2 voters. Linked Domains satisfy
Modified Property T.
The thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces definitions and the
basic model. Section 3 describes the sufficient condition for tops-onlyness. Section
4 provides three related lemmas, while section 5 gives the proof of the theorem.
3
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
Let I = { 1, 2, . . . , N } denote the set of voters, |I| = n and n ≥ 2. Let A denote
the finite set of alternatives, |A| = m and m ≥ 3. Let P denote the set of all strict
linear orders over A. A subset D ⊂ P denotes an admissible domain. A typical
preference ordering for voter i is denoted by Pi. Let P = (P1, P2, . . . , PN) ∈ Dn
denote a profile of preferences. We will write P = (Pi, P−i) in the usual way.
Let a sub-domain DS = {Pi ∈ D | τ(Pi) ∈ S}, where S ⊆ A. When S is a
singleton set, say S = {a}, we write DS as Da. For 2 alternatives: a, b ∈ A, aPi b
represents that a is strictly preferred to b in Pi. Let rk(Pi) denote the kth ranked
alternative in Pi, while τ(Pi) denotes the top-ranked alternative in Pi.
Definition 1 A Social Choice Function (SCF) is a mapping f : Dn → A.
Definition 2 The Domain D satisfies minimal richness, if for all a ∈ A, there
exists Pi ∈ D, such that τ(Pi) = a.
Remark 1 Minimal richness implies |D| ≥ m.
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Definition 3 A SCF f : Dn → A satisfies unanimity, if for all a ∈ A and
P ∈ Dn, such that τ(Pi) = a, for all i ∈ I, then f(P ) = a.
Unanimity property plays an important role in our following analysis. Una-
nimity implies that the SCF is an onto function.
Definition 4 A SCF f : Dn → A is strategy-proof, if for all i ∈ I; Pi, P ′i ∈ D and
P−i ∈ Dn−1, we have either f(Pi, P−i)Pi f(P ′i , P−i), or f(Pi, P−i) = f(P ′i , P−i).
Definition 5 The preference profiles P and P ′ are tops-equivalent, if τ(Pi) =
τ(P ′i ), for all i ∈ I. A SCF f : Dn → A satisfies the tops-only property, if f(P ) =
f(P ′), whenever P and P ′ are tops-equivalent.
Definition 6 A Domain D satisfies the tops-only property, if every strategy-proof
and unanimous SCF f : Dn → A satisfies the tops-only property.
A domain that satisfies the tops-only property will be referred to as a tops-only
domain.
Remark 2 Dictatorial domains are tops-only domains.
The objective of this thesis is to provide a sufficient condition that ensures that
a domain is a tops-only domain. Recent work on tops-only domains (Weymark
(2008) and Chatterji & Sen (2011)) uses the notion of option set1.
Definition 7 For a strategy-proof and unanimous SCF f : Dn → A, given P−i ∈
Dn−1, the option set for voter i is the set Oi(P−i) = {a ∈ A | a = f(Pi, P−i), Pi ∈
D}.
1Introduced originally by Barbera` & Peleg (1990).
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Chatterji & Sen (2011) (Proposition 1) shows that a SCF satisfies the tops-
only property if and only if the option sets for every voter satisfy the tops-only
property, that is, a SCF f : Dn → A satisfies the tops-only property, if and only
if Oi(P−i) = Oi(P ′−i), for all i ∈ I and P−i, P ′−i ∈ Dn−1 which are tops-equivalent.
Thus, the subsequent analysis focuses on the tops-onlyness of option sets.
2.1 The case of two voters
We henceforth specialize the discussion to the case of 2 voters: the set of voters
is I = {i, j}, and the SCF is f : D2 → A. We now describe Linked Domains
(Aswal et al., 2003).
Definition 8 A pair of alternatives: a, b ∈ A, are connected, denoted a ∼ b, if
∃Pi, P ′i ∈ D, such that τ(Pi) = a, r2(Pi) = b, τ(P ′i ) = b and r2(P ′i ) = a.
Definition 9 Let B ⊂ A, and a ∈ A − B. Then a is linked to B, if ∃b, c ∈ B,
such that a ∼ b and a ∼ c.
Definition 10 The Domain D is linked if there exists a one to one function
σ : {1, . . . ,m} → {1, . . . ,m}, such that
1. aσ(1) ∼ aσ(2).
2. aσ(j) is linked to {aσ(1), . . . aσ(j−1)}, j = 3, . . . ,m.
Linked Domains are dictatorial domains. In the case of 2 voters, we can find
a fixed voter, for instance, voter i, such that the option set for voter i is equal to
the set of alternatives, given any preference of voter j in the domain: Oi(Pj) = A,
for all Pj ∈ D. This indicates that voter i is the dictator.
6
We now turn to domains that satisfy the tops-only property. Chatterji & Sen
(2011) provides a sufficient condition, named Property T, which ensures that a
minimally rich domain is a tops-only domain in the case of 2 voters.
Definition 11 The Domain D satisfies Property T, if for all Pi ∈ D and a ∈
A− {τ(Pi)}, ∃b ∈ A− {a}, such that b Pi a and b ∼ a.
Many restricted domains meet the requirement of Property T. For instance,
Circular Domains, Adjacency Rich Single-Peaked Domains (Chatterji & Sen
(2011)) and Domains of Separable Preferences all satisfy the Property T. However,
Property T may be inapplicable for some restricted domains. We now provide an
example that is neither linked, nor satisfies Property T.
Example 1 A = {a1, a2, a3, a4, a5}, the Domain Dusp is constructed by the fol-
lowing 12 preference orderings:
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12
a1 a2 a1 a3 a2 a3 a2 a4 a3 a4 a4 a5
a2 a1 a3 a1 a3 a2 a4 a2 a4 a3 a5 a4
a3 a3 a2 a2 a1 a1 · · · · a2 a1
a4 a4 a4 a4 a4 a4 · · · · a3 a2
a5 a5 a5 a5 a5 a5 · · · · a1 a3
Table 2.1: Domain Dusp
Here, dots on Pk, k = 7, 8, 9, 10, signify that alternatives ranked 3 and be-
yond are arbitrarily assigned. The corresponding connectivity graph of Dusp is
following:
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Figure 2.1: Connectivity Graph of Domain Dusp
According to Figure 2.1, it is evident that Dusp is not linked. Since for all Pk ∈
Da5usp, a4 = r2(Pk), the unique seconds property
1 is satisfied by Dusp. Applying
Theorem 5.1 in Aswal et al. (1999), it follows that Dusp is non-dictatorial. Next,
though the first 11 preferences in Dusp all satisfy the requirement of Property T,
the preference P12 does not satisfy Property T, as neither a5, nor a4 is connected
to a1. Existing results in the literature do not allow us to decide whether or
not Dusp is a tops-only domain. This thesis provides a more general sufficient
condition that applies to such domains.
1Introduced originally by Aswal et al. (1999). A Domain D satisfies the unique seconds
property, if ∃a, b ∈ A, such that for all Pi ∈ Da, b = r2(Pi).
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Chapter 3
Modified Property T
We first introduce the notions of a dictatorial sub-domain and a linked sub-
domain.
Definition 12 Let S ⊆ A, |S| = k ≥ 3. A sub-domain DS is a dictatorial sub-
domain, if for all strategy-proof and unanimous SCFs, there exists a fixed voter,
for instance, voter i, such that Oi(Pj)
⋂
S = S, for all Pj ∈ DS. Then for voter
j, Oj(Pi)
⋂
S = {τ(Pi)}, for all Pi ∈ DS.
Definition 13 Let S ⊆ A, |S| = k ≥ 3. A sub-domain DS is a linked sub-
domain, if for all elements in S, there exists a one to one function σ : {1, 2, · · · , k} →
{1, 2, · · · , k}, such that
1. aσ(1) ∼ aσ(2).
2. aσ(i) is linked to { aσ(1), aσ(2), · · · , aσ(i−1) }, i = 3, · · · , k.
Remark 3 The Domain D is linked, if and only if k = m, where |A| = m.
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Remark 4 A linked sub-domain is a dictatorial sub-domain. This is implied in
the proof of lemma 3.4 - 3.9 in Aswal et al. (2003).
We illustrate with the example in Table 2.1. Though Dusp is not linked, it
contains a linked sub-domain: DSusp, where S = {a1, a2, a3, a4}. Next, we provide
the definition of weak path connectivity in a sub-domain1.
Definition 14 A sub-domain DS, |S| ≥ 2, is weakly path-connected, if for all
a, b ∈ S, there exists a sequence {ak}tk=1 ⊆ S, t ≥ 2, such that a1 = a, at = b and
ak−1 ∼ ak, for k = 2, . . . , t.
Remark 5 A linked sub-domain is weakly path-connected. However, a dictatorial
sub-domain may not be necessarily weakly path-connected. Weak path connectivity
provides a path for the transitivity of a property, which is crucial in what follows.
We now turn to the description of Modified Property T, which is the central
notion of this thesis. We begin with some notation.
Notation 1 Given Pi ∈ D, X(Pi) = {x ∈ A−{τ(Pi)} | @y ∈ A, such that y Pi x
and y ∼ x}.
Notation 2 Given Pi ∈ D and a ∈ A, The upper contour set and lower contour
set of a in Pi are sets: B(Pi, a) = {x ∈ A |xPi a} and W (Pi, a) = {x ∈ A | aPi x}.
1The definition of weakly path-connected domain is originally introduced by Chatterji,
Sanver & Sen (2010). We apply their definition to the sub-domain.
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Definition 15 A Domain D satisfies Modified Property T, if for all Pi ∈ D and
a ∈ A− {τ(Pi)}, either a /∈ X(Pi), or if a ∈ X(Pi), then
(i) ∃S ⊆ A, such that a ∈ S.
(ii) The sub-domain DS is a weakly path-connected dictatorial sub-domain.
(iii) B(Pi, a)
⋂
S 6= ∅.
Remark 6 A Domain satisfying Property T satisfies Modified Property T. In-
deed, if Domain D satisfies Property T, then X(Pi) = ∅, for all Pi ∈ D.
Remark 7 Linked Domains satisfy Modified Property T. A Linked Domain DL
itself is also a linked sub-domain. Then for all Pi ∈ DL and a ∈ A − {τ(Pi)},
∃S = A, such that a ∈ S and B(Pi, a)
⋂
S 6= ∅.
Returning to the example in Table 2.1, recall that Dusp contains a linked sub-
domain. Observe that the preference P12 ∈ Dusp satisfies all three requirements
of Modified Property T. It follows that Dusp satisfies Modified Property T. Our
theorem will prove that domains satisfying Modified Property T are tops-only.
We observe that if we add a new preference P13: τ(P13) = a1 and r2(P13) = a5
to Dusp, the new Domain D
′
usp violates Modified Property T. By the unique
seconds property, we propose a strategy-proof and unanimous SCF for D′usp:
f(Pi, Pj) =
 τ(Pi) , if τ(Pi) 6= a5max(Pj, {a4, a5}) , if τ(Pi) = a5
Given three preferences: Pi = P12, Pj = P1 and P
′
j = P13, the SCF gives two
different outcomes: f(Pi, Pj) = a4 and f(Pi, P
′
j) = a5, which shows that D
′
usp
doesn’t satisfy the tops-only property.
11
Chapter 4
Lemmas
Lemma 1 Given a preference Pi, if x ∈ Oj(Pi), z Pi x and z ∼ x, then x ∈
Oj(P¯i), for all P¯i ∈ D, such that z ∈ Oj(P¯i).1
Proof. Suppose not, then ∃P ′i ∈ D, such that z ∈ Oj(P ′i ) and x /∈ Oj(P ′i ).
Given a preference Pj: τ(Pj) = x and r2(Pj) = z, then f(P
′
i , Pj) = Max(Pj, Oj(P
′
i ))
= z; and f(Pi, Pj) = Max(Pj, Oj(Pi)) = x. Since z Pi x, voter i will manipulate
at (Pi, Pj) via P
′
i . Therefore, x ∈ Oj(P¯i), whenever Oj(P¯i) contains z.
Lemma 2 Given a preference Pi, if x ∈ Oj(Pi), z Pi x and z ∼ x, then z ∈
Oj(Pi).
2
Proof. Suppose not, then z /∈ Oj(Pi). Given Pj: τ(Pj) = z and r2(Pj) = x,
then f(Pi, Pj) = Max(Pj, Oj(Pi)) = x; and f(P
′
i , Pj) = z, for all P
′
i ∈ Dz. Since
z Pi x, voter i will manipulate at (Pi, Pj) via P
′
i . Hence, z ∈ Oj(Pi).
1See the appendix of Aswal et al. (1999).
2See the appendix of Aswal et al. (1999).
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Lemma 3 Suppose a sub-domain DS, where S ⊂ A, is a weakly path-connected
dictatorial sub-domain with Oj(Pi)
⋂
S = S, for all Pi ∈ DS. Given a preference
P ∗i /∈ DS, if ∃b ∈ S, such that b ∈ Oj(P ∗i ), then S ⊂ Oj(P ∗i ).
Proof. The sub-domainDS is weakly path-connected, then for all c ∈ S−{b},
there exists a sequence {xk}tk=1 ⊆ S, such that x1 = c, xt = b and xk−1 ∼ xk, for
k = 2, . . . , t. Since Oj(Pi)
⋂
S = S, for all Pi ∈ DS, there exists P ′i ∈ Db, such
that xt−1 ∈ Oj(P ′i ). Next, by lemma 1, we have xt−1 ∈ Oj(P ∗i ). Following the
sequence, repeatedly applying lemma 1, we conclude that c ∈ Oj(P ∗i ). Hence,
S ⊂ Oj(P ∗i ).
13
Chapter 5
Theorem
Theorem 1 Assume n = 2. If a minimally rich Domain D satisfies Modified
Property T, then it satisfies the tops-only property.
Proof. Consider a preference ordering P ∗i : a  · · ·  x1  · · ·  xk  · · ·,
where X(P ∗i ) = {x1, . . . , xk} satisfies the definition of notation 1.
Define Tl(P
∗
i ) = B(P
∗
i , xl)
⋂
W (P ∗i , xl−1), 1 ≤ l ≤ k and x0 = a. Any
alternative in Tl(P
∗
i ) must be connected to an alternative from its upper contour
set.
Let a sub-domainDSl denote a weakly path-connected dictatorial sub-domain,
such that xl ∈ Sl and ∃bl ∈ B(P ∗i , xl)
⋂
Sl, where l = 1, 2, . . . , k.
Let x ∈ Oj(P ∗i ), where x ∈ B(P ∗i , xl)
⋃{xl}, 0 ≤ l ≤ k, x0 = a, B(P ∗i , x0) = ∅;
or x ∈ W (P ∗i , xk).1 We will show by induction on l that x ∈ Oj(P ′i ), for all
P ′i ∈ Da.
Claim 5.1 If x = a, then x ∈ Oj(P ′i ).
1The worst preferred alternative rm(P
∗
i ) /∈ X(P ∗i ), then W (P ∗i , xk) 6= ∅. So, we must also
consider the set W (P ∗i , xk).
14
The claim above follows from unanimity of the SCF.
Claim 5.2 If x ∈ T1(P ∗i ), then x ∈ Oj(P ′i ).
This claim follows from Theorem 1 of Chatterji & Sen (2011). For complete-
ness, we verify it as follows. Since any alternative in T1(P
∗
i ) is connected to an
alternative from its upper contour set, there exists a sequence {yj}tj=1, t ≥ 2, such
that y1 = x, {yj}tj=2 ⊆ B(P ∗i , x), yt = a, yj−1 ∼ yj and yj P ∗i yj−1, for j = 2, . . . , t.
According to lemma 2, following the sequence, we have {yj}tj=1 ⊆ Oj(P ∗i ). Next,
by unanimity, yt = a ∈ Oj(P ′i ), then according to lemma 1, yt−1 ∈ Oj(P ′i ). Thus,
repeated application of lemma 1 gives x ∈ Oj(P ′i ).
Claim 5.3 If x = x1, then x ∈ Oj(P ′i ).
Firstly, we specify whetherOj(Pi)
⋂
S1 = S1, for all Pi ∈ DS1 ; orOi(Pj)
⋂
S1 =
S1, for all Pj ∈ DS1 . Suppose Oi(Pj)
⋂
S1 = S1, for all Pj ∈ DS1 . Given a pref-
erence P¯j ∈ Dx1 , then f(P ∗i , P¯j) = Max(P¯j, Oj(P ∗i )) = x1, because x1 = x ∈
Oj(P
∗
i ). Given another preference P¯i ∈ Db1 , then f(P¯i, P¯j) = Max(P¯i, Oi(P¯j)) =
b1, because Oi(P¯j)
⋂
S1 = S1 and b1 ∈ S1. Since b1 P ∗i x1, voter i will manipulate
at (P ∗i , P¯j) via P¯i. Therefore, Oj(Pi)
⋂
S1 = S1, for all Pi ∈ DS1 .
Secondly, if a ∈ S1, then by the definition of a dictatorial sub-domain, we have
x1 ∈ Oj(P ′i ). Next, we complete the proof with the analysis of the case: a /∈ S1.
Thus, b1 ∈ T1(P ∗i ). Since b1 ∈ S1 and x1 ∈ Oj(P ∗i ), by lemma 3, b1 ∈ Oj(P ∗i ).
Next, claim 5.2 implies that b1 ∈ Oj(P ′i ). Applying lemma 3 again, we conclude
that x ∈ Oj(P ′i ).
Now assume that x ∈ B(P ∗i , xl′)
⋃{xl′} and x ∈ Oj(P ∗i ) imply x ∈ Oj(P ′i ),
for all l′ < l. We will show that x ∈ B(P ∗i , xl)
⋃{xl} and x ∈ Oj(P ∗i ) imply
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x ∈ Oj(P ′i ). Thus, we only need to focus on the set Tl(P ∗i )
⋃{xl}.
Claim 5.4 If x ∈ Tl(P ∗i ), then x ∈ Oj(P ′i ).
Similar to claim 5.2, there exists a sequence {yj}sj=1, s ≥ 2, such that y1 = x,
{yj}s−1j=2 ⊆ B(P ∗i , x)
⋂
Tl(P
∗
i ), ys ∈ B(P ∗i , xl−1)
⋃{xl−1}, yj−1 ∼ yj and yj P ∗i yj−1,
for j = 2, . . . , s.
By lemma 2, following the sequence, we have {yj}sj=1 ⊆ Oj(P ∗i ). Next, by in-
duction hypothesis, ys ∈ Oj(P ′i ). Then, applying lemma 1 iteratively, we conclude
that x ∈ Oj(P ′i ).
Claim 5.5 If x = xl, then xl ∈ Oj(P ′i ).
Firstly, similar to claim 5.3, we have Oj(Pi)
⋂
Sl = Sl, for all Pi ∈ DSl .
Secondly, if a ∈ Sl, then the definition of a dictatorial sub-domain implies that
xl ∈ Oj(P ′i ). Next, we complete the proof with the analysis of the case: a /∈ Sl.
Similar to claim 5.3, lemma 3 implies that bl ∈ Oj(P ∗i ). Since bl ∈ B(P ∗i , xl) =
B(P ∗i , xl−1)
⋃{xl−1}⋃Tl(P ∗i ), according to induction hypothesis or claim 5.4, we
have bl ∈ Oj(P ′i ). Apply lemma 3 again, we conclude that x ∈ Oj(P ′i ).
Claim 5.6 For all x ∈ B(P ∗i , xk)
⋃{xk}, if x ∈ Oj(P ∗i ), then x ∈ Oj(P ′i ), for all
P ′i ∈ Da.
This claim follows from claims 5.1 to 5.5.
Claim 5.7 If x ∈ W (P ∗i , xk), then x ∈ Oj(P ′i ).
Similar to claim 5.4, since any alternative in W (P ∗i , xk) is connected to an
alternative from its upper contour set, there exists a sequence {yj}sj=1, s ≥ 2, such
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that y1 = x, {yj}s−1j=2 ⊆ B(P ∗i , x)
⋂
W (P ∗i , xk), ys ∈ B(P ∗i , xk)
⋃{xk}, yj−1 ∼ yj
and yj P
∗
i yj−1, for j = 2, . . . , s.
By lemma 2, following the sequence, we have {yj}sj=1 ⊆ Oj(P ∗i ). Next, by
claim 5.6, ys ∈ Oj(P ′i ). Then, applying lemma 1 iteratively, we conclude that
x ∈ Oj(P ′i ).
In conclusion, for all x ∈ A, if x ∈ Oj(P ∗i ), then x ∈ Oj(P ′i ), for all P ′i ∈ Da.
This implies that Oj(P
∗
i ) ⊆ Oj(P ′i ), for all P ′i ∈ Da. The proof for Oj(P ′i ) ⊆
Oj(P
∗
i ) is identical. Therefore, Oj(P
∗
i ) = Oj(P
′
i ), for all P
∗
i , P
′
i ∈ Da. Hence, we
conclude that Oj(Pi) = Oj(P
′
i ) whenever Pi and P
′
i are tops-equivalent.
An identical argument with subscripts i and j interchanged gives a symmetric
conclusion: Oi(Pj) = Oi(P
′
j), whenever Pj and P
′
j are tops-equivalent. Therefore,
in the case of 2 voters, Modified Property T implies the tops-only property.
17
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